Recent Developments in the Theory of the Shapley Value · 1978-econ-15
Cooperative Game Theory · ICM 1978: Recent Developments in the Theory of the Shapley Value
Inferred from the community field; finer classification has not been reviewed.
Problem statement
Let be a measurable space, where is the set of players and is a -field of coalitions. A game is a function such that , and it is monotone if implies . An outcome is a finitely additive game.
For every nonatomic probability measure on and every quota , define the nonatomic weighted-majority game
Let be the smallest set of games containing every such and closed under pointwise addition, scalar multiplication, and multiplication.
For a measurable automorphism (a bijection such that both and are measurable), define
A value on is an operator satisfying all of the following:
- Linearity: for all and .
- Monotonicity: if is monotone, then is monotone.
- Symmetry: for every measurable automorphism and every .
- Efficiency: for every .
For a finite measurable partition of , let be the finite field generated by its atoms and let be the finite game on those atoms defined by for . Write for the Shapley value of a finite game: if is its finite player set, then for ,
where the sum is over all permutations of and is the set of players preceding in ; for a coalition , set .
A value on is called a partition value if, for every and every , there exists a sequence of finite measurable partitions such that each refines , ,
and
Determine whether a partition value exists on .
Lean 4
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Progress & source assessment
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The problem is unresolved. The algebra contains finite linear combinations of products of arbitrarily many nonatomic weighted-majority games. The strongest verified partition-value theorem covers individual scalar bounded-variation games and products with at most two singular scalar factors, but no located result extends it to products of arbitrary finite length. Conversely, no counterexample to the existence of a partition value on all of was found.
Robert J. Aumann, “Recent Developments in the Theory of the Shapley Value,” Proceedings of the International Congress of Mathematicians, Helsinki 1978, Academia Scientiarum Fennica, 1980, pp. 995–1003, direct bibliographic record. Section 5 explicitly poses the existence of a partition value on the algebra generated by all nonatomic weighted-majority games as an open question.
Abraham Neyman and Yair Tauman, “The Partition Value,” Mathematics of Operations Research 4(3) (1979), 236–264, doi:10.1287/moor.4.3.236. Theorem 5.52 constructs a partition value on the closed linear space generated by , , the algebra generated by continuous scalar measure games, and the product spaces , , and . Since a weighted-majority game is a scalar game, this proves the desired conclusion for individual generators, their linear combinations, and products involving at most two discontinuous weighted-majority factors. It does not cover the unrestricted algebra .
Abraham Neyman, “Weighted Majority Games Have Asymptotic Value,” Mathematics of Operations Research 13(4) (1988), 556–580, doi:10.1287/moor.13.4.556. This proves that every weighted-majority game has an asymptotic value, which is stronger than having a partition value for each single generator. It gives no common partition value for arbitrary products of generators.
Jean-François Mertens, “Values and Derivatives,” Mathematics of Operations Research 5(4) (1980), 523–552, doi:10.1287/moor.5.4.523. Mertens constructs values on much larger spaces containing nondifferentiable games with jumps. This establishes relevant axiomatic-value existence, but the construction is not by limits of Shapley values along refining finite partitions and therefore does not establish the partition-value property required here.
Abraham Neyman, “Values of Games with Infinitely Many Players,” in Robert J. Aumann and Sergiu Hart (eds.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, vol. 3, Elsevier, 2002, pp. 2121–2167, doi:10.1016/S1574-0005(02)03019-9. Section 9.2 surveys partition values and records only the Neyman–Tauman theorem above, while separately describing values on the closed algebra generated by . It supplies no partition-value extension to that algebra.
Abraham Neyman and Rann Smorodinsky, “Asymptotic Values of Vector Measure Games,” Mathematics of Operations Research 29(4) (2004), 739–775, doi:10.1287/moor.1040.0118. This proves asymptotic-value results for certain nonsmooth vector-measure and multi-house games under additional atomic “sufficient variety” hypotheses, and explicitly notes that not all nonatomic two-house weighted-majority games have asymptotic values. These conditional asymptotic results neither cover the fully nonatomic algebra nor provide the missing global partition value.
Thus the established literature handles each generator and substantial low-degree or specially structured subclasses, and axiomatic values exist on broader ambient spaces. What remains unproved is precisely the existence (or nonexistence) of one linear, monotone, symmetric, efficient value on all finite products in that also has the stated partition-limit property.
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